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Peer-to-peer energy trading 
Transactive energy 
A B S T R A C T   
Peer-to-peer transactions appear in smart grids as a way to enable the direct transaction of energy among end- 
users (i.e., consumers, producers, and prosumers). This concept promotes the efficient use of local renewable 
energy sources among neighbours. Several studies proposed the application of peer-to-peer models for energy 
communities, microgrids, and aggregators to decrease energy costs for end-users and to promote the balance 
between consumption and generation. In this paper, it is proposed a framework to test, and validate, using a real 
environment, single- and multi-unit peer-to-peer auctions. It is also proposed six lightweight fully distributed 
peer-to-peer auction models, avoiding the need for a central operator. The lightweight of the proposed models 
enables their execution in the fog-computing layer using single-board computers deployed in end-users. The 
proposed framework, together with the proposed day-ahead models, was tested and validated in a real microgrid 
with five prosumers. The results of two weeks are discussed using a comparative economic analysis. The pro-
posed framework and models were able to reduce energy costs for the end-users, promoting competitive free 
market behaviours, with multi-unit models outperforming single-unit models in the overall trading efficiency and 
monetary profits.   
1. Introduction 
Over recent years, distributed energy resources (DERs) have been 
massively integrated into the power grid, bringing benefits to the grid 
[1] and to end-user [2]. Also, the penetration of renewable energy 
sources (RESs) is rapidly increasing, and some predict that, by 2050, 
60% of the world’s generation will be provided by RESs [3]. The large 
growth of DERs has been leading to the decentralization of the power 
system, and to the shifting of the paradigm towards a distributed smart 
grid [45]. Microgrids have been used to solve integration issues of RESs 
by managing local demand and local supply, including the management 
of DERs [6]. However, the increasing penetration of intermittent energy 
generation from renewables, such as photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind 
turbines, has raised concerns about the grid’s stability and reliability 
[7,8]. 
Transactive energy (TE) is defined, by The GridWise Architecture 
Council (GWAC), as “a system of economic and control mechanisms that 
allows the dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical 
infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter” [9], indicating 
that the main purpose of TE is the continuous balancing between 
consumption and generation through economic methodologies. This 
concept, actively contributes to the stability and reliability of the grid, 
enabling the massive penetration of distributed energy sources, namely 
renewable and clean energy sources [10]. 
Seen as one of the most promising implementations of TE, peer-to- 
peer (P2P) markets allow producers, consumers, and prosumers to 
trade energy among each other in a market platform, ensuring their 
autonomy and decision [11]. Through this concept, a local energy 
market can be conceived in which end-users engage in bi-directional 
communication, providing bids and offers to the market autono-
mously, based on their own local needs and preferences [12]. While this 
approach puts greater regard to end-user autonomy [13] and reduces 
their electricity billing, it also may be used to solve network manage-
ment issues, ensuring greater network stability and energy efficiency 
[11]. 
P2P transactions are commonly used for energy sharing among end- 
users, especially energy communities [14]. In [15], an intercommunity 
P2P framework is proposed to allow energy transactions among end- 
users considering real-time uncertainties. A P2P model to promote the 
community’s welfare prioritizing the end-users willingness-to-pay, over 
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self-consumption, is proposed in [16]. However, P2P models must be 
carefully studied, tested, and evaluated before being deployed. An 
evaluation framework is proposed in [17], allowing the evaluation of 
bill sharing, mid-market rate, and supply and demand ratio models. In 
[18], a multi-agent approach is used to test and simulate P2P trans-
actions among end-users, where the proposed framework applies eval-
uation indexes to evaluate the performance of models. While this type of 
framework allows the simulation of P2P models, there is still a lack of 
real deployments where P2P can be tested. 
P2P models can also be applied to increase the efficient use of energy 
storage units in a community [19]. In [20], a model for P2P energy 
sharing allows the distribution use of energy storage units in a com-
munity. A two-stage aggregation model for microgrids is proposed in 
[21] where local renewable generation is shared among end-users to be 
consumed and stored. 
Over recent years multiple P2P energy trading projects have 
emerged. In the UK, the Piclo project enables P2P energy trading 
through auctions held between local renewable energy producers and 
business customers [22]. In Germany, the sonnenCommunity project 
allows P2P trading among sonnenBatterie owners [23]. In the US, the 
Brooklyn Microgrid project connects prosumers and consumers who can 
trade energy in near-real-time through a platform in their local 
marketplace [24]. In Bangkok, Thailand, a P2P renewable energy 
trading solution was implemented in the T77 precinct connecting a 
shopping centre, a school, an apartment building, and a dental hospital 
[25,26]. 
A common approach, to solve P2P transactions, is the use of game 
theory techniques [27]. The Stackelberg equilibrium is used in [28] 
together with the application of demand response programs to maximize 
the profit of the energy-shared provider. In [29], the Stackelberg equi-
librium is used to share energy among players in a virtual energy station. 
The Nash equilibrium is estimated in [30], where a non-cooperative 
stochastic game is used. Approaches based on game theory promote 
the equilibrium of prices but bring high complexity that is difficult to 
scale. Also, the use of low computational hardware to participate in 
game theory models can be unachievable. 
Market-based designs are also a possible approach to address P2P 
transactions. In recent years, several studies regarding the use of 
auction-based market-clearing methods to achieve efficient energy 
allocation and fair electricity prices have been conducted. An auction- 
based market clearing mechanism is presented in [31], where market 
performance indexes are used to compare different trading methods. In 
[32] a double auction mechanism is proposed to maximize the welfare of 
market subscribers. Another research study has compared the perfor-
mance of four different bidding strategies across two auction mecha-
nisms using a game theory approach [33]. 
Most studies concerning P2P energy trading focuses on energy 
management and on simple economic aspects. Monetary profit alone 
does not provide a good measure of the market’s performance, and a 
deeper analysis must be made to perceive how an auction model deals 
with competitiveness and shifts in supply and demand, considering both 
overall outcome, fairness, and free-market behaviours. Hence, this paper 
provides an analysis of how a P2P market behaves under an auction 
framework, and a comparison between different auction models, 
focusing on economic concepts and competitive-market behaviours. 
This paper’s main contributions are the proposal of a single-unit and 
multi-unit energy auction framework for P2P transactions, and the 
comparative economic analysis of four single-unit and two multi-unit 
P2P energy trading auction models. These models have been built to 
be executable in the edge and fog layers using low computation hard-
ware. This means that the proposed P2P models can be placed in real 
scenarios using a distributed auction approach, without depending on a 
centralized provider/player or demanding a server or a cloud solution. 
The proposed auction models are applied to a real microgrid pilot 
with five prosumers. The microgrid’s prosumers are represented using 
the μGIM platform that enables the necessary communications among 
agents, and where each prosumer is represented by an agent [34]. Each 
prosumer manages a small office and tries to minimize his/her energy 
cost by participating in the P2P auction market. This paper presents the 
comparative competitive-market analysis of the developed auction 
models considering two heterogeneous case studies: a week with a high 
energy generation profile compared to the consumption profile and 
allowing more energy to be transacted, and a week with a low genera-
tion profile compared to the consumption profile allowing less energy to 
be transacted. 
Following this introductory section, the paper is organised as fol-
lows. In Section 2, the P2P auction framework is presented, providing a 
brief overview of the μGIM platform and introducing concepts used 
throughout the remaining of the paper. Section 3 and Section 4 present 
the proposed and implemented single-unit and multi-unit auction 
models, respectively, describing each one in detail. The considered case 
studies are explored in Section 5. Section 6 introduces and discusses the 
results obtained from the P2P transactions of each auction model, 
considering the case studies. This paper concludes with Section 7, stat-
ing the main conclusions that could be taken from the comparative 
competitive-market analysis of the P2P trading models and the prospects 
for future work. 
2. Peer-to-peer auction framework 
The proposed peer-to-peer auction framework was developed in the 
Microgrid Intelligent Management (μGIM) platform. This multi-agent 
system allows the representation of end-users, integrating the end- 
users loads and resources, and providing an energy management solu-
tion for the end-users building/home. The μGIM, not only can manage 
the end-users building/home, but also provides a communication layer 
to enable communication and negotiation with other end-users and 
players. 
2.1. μGIM 
The six auction models were implemented, compared, and validated 
through the μGIM platform proposed in [34]. This solution provides an 
agent-based management system that enables the monitoring and con-
trol of building resources, as well as energy trading among microgrid 
end-users. The agents run in low-cost and low-power single-board 
computers (SBC) and energy analysers and internet of things devices, 
such as smart plugs, are used to manage energy resources. 
The μGIM platform provides a base for peer-to-peer energy trading 
markets where microgrid’s end-users can participate, to buy or sell en-
ergy. The auctions are distributed and auctioned by the sellers. How-
ever, the μGIM platform only had a pre-existing English model, 
discussed in [35]. This paper presents five new auction models and their 
respective bidding strategies that are proposed and tested in the μGIM 
platform, alongside the pre-existing English model. 
In the μGIM platform, agents perform local hour-ahead and fifteen- 
minute-ahead forecasts to predict what their consumption and genera-
tion will be for the next periods. These forecasts are obtained using 
support vector machine (SVM) algorithms that consider as input the 
historical data and weather forecasts provided by third-parties. The 
peer-to-peer auctions are performed each hour and agents use the hour- 
ahead forecasted consumption and generation to decide on the amount 
of energy to buy or sell at each auction [35]. 
The forecasts, available by μGIM platform, enable the end-users to 
manage their energy usage ahead in time. This allows end-users to 
participate in auctions for energy trading. Where they can negotiate and 
bid energy lots among each other. Therefore, an hour-ahead auction- 
based approach is proposed in this paper to enable energy trading 
among end-users, promoting the use of local generation, namely volatile 
renewable energy sources. 
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2.2. Auctions 
A large variety of market schemes fall under the concept of “auction” 
[36]. Hence, it can be difficult to accurately describe what constitutes an 
auction. Across all typical market models that are considered as auc-
tions, prevails the use of bids for buyers to report their willingness to 
pay, and the market’s outcome is deduced solely from these reported 
values [36]. 
In the proposed framework, an auction is considered to be an hourly 
event in which an auctioneer gathers energy lots to be sold and performs 
auctions in which buyers submit bids for the given units to whom they 
are then sold. The set of lots to be auctioned constitutes an “auction 
catalogue” and an auction model consists of rules and logic that govern 
the process by which the lots in the auction catalogue are auctioned. 
Thus, the nature of the energy lots, the way the lots are auctioned, the 
bids, and the outcome vary across different auction models. 
The considered P2P auction models are executed on an hourly basis 
and the process consists of two distinct phases: the first consists of the 
gathering of the energy lots to sell; and the second one focuses on the 
collection of bids and on calculating the auction’s outcome. The first 
phase is executed at the 30-minute, after which the second phase begins, 
at the 35-minute mark. Based on their hour-ahead forecasts, the agents 
attempt to negotiate their next-hour energy surplus or deficit encapsu-
lated as energy lots to sell or as bids to buy lots through P2P energy 
trading. 
An energy lot is represented by the amount of energy (in Wh) that a 
seller wishes to sell together with the minimum price at which it can be 
sold, which is presented in EUR/kWh (the same price format is used for 
biding). An agent determines the amount of energy to sell in an auction 
as in equation (1) 
Esaac = Fgenh+1 − Fconsh+1 (1)  
where Esaac is the amount of energy to be sold by agent a in the auction 
catalogue ac given the hour-ahead forecasted generation Fgenh+1 and 
consumption Fconsh+1 . 
The prices of bids and lots are limited by the retailer selling and 
buying energy prices. These limits define the minimum and maximum 
values at which an energy lot can be traded. These values correspond to 
the purchase price of energy from the retailer and the price of selling 
energy to the retailer. Evaluations that reside outside these boundaries 
are deemed irrational, as an agent would be better off trading with the 
conventional grid instead. A seller’s minimum price for an auction is 





h (2)  
where Lminaac is the minimum price of agent a’ s lots in EUR/kWh, M
s
h is the 
price of selling 1.0 kWh to the conventional grid and mPsa is a parame-
trized value of agent a that denotes the minimum percentage of Msh that 
the agent is willing to sell for. 
In a single-unit auction, an energy lot is sold to only one buyer, 
considering that the lot cannot be divided among multiple buyers (i.e., it 
is an indivisible unit). If a seller reports all the energy to be sold as a 
single lot, e.g. 2.0 kWh, there may be no buyer that wishes to buy that 
amount. As an alternative, the auctioneer could auction 1 Wh at a time, 
but this procedure would result in auctions taking too long to conclude, 
and in cases where the amount to trade is particularly high some of the 
energy may not be able to be sold, with the auction ending before all 
units in the auction catalogue are auctioned. The use of a maximum lot 
size threshold solves this issue by making it so that large energy lots are 
auctioned as smaller sized lots that buyers may wish to bid for. The 







where Lnumberaac denotes the number of lots to sell and ML
s
a corresponds to 
agent a’s maximum lot size. The use of the maximum lot size parameter 
enables the auctioning of a multi-unit commodity, such as energy, as a 
single-unit commodity and, therefore, the use of single-unit auction 
models for P2P energy trading. Thus, a seller, instead of reporting a 
single lot, delivers an array of energy lots to be auctioned, each with a 
maximum size of MLsa. The maximum size will define the size of energy 
lots that agent a will auction. For instance, if agent a has 110 Wh to sell 
and MLsa = 50Wh, then agent a will auction three energy lots: two lots of 
50 Wh, and one lot with the remaining 10 Wh. 
In a multi-unit auction, an energy lot can be sold to multiple buyers, 
being seen as a divisible unit, or a set of units. Thus, a seller wishing to 
sell 2.0 kWh will announce this amount as single energy lot, which can 
then be sold to one buyer if this one desires the whole lot, or to multiple 
buyers, partitioning the lot into various smaller lots. The amount of 
energy to sell in an auction is advertised by each seller as an array with a 
single element. 
The amount of energy that can be traded in an auction, considering 









where Esh+1 consists of the summation of the amount of energy, equation 
(5), that each agent has to sell in h + 1, which is given by the difference 
between forecasted generation and consumption, equation (6). Like-
wise, Ebh+1 is the summation of each agent’s amount of energy to buy, 
equation (7), resulted from the difference between forecasted con-
sumption and forecasted generation, equation (8). For equations (6) and 
(8), if the difference between consumption and generation, and vice- 













Ebah+1 (7)  
Ebah+1 =
{
Fconsh+1 − Fgenh+1 ,Fgenh+1 < Fconsh+1
0,Fgenh+1 ≥ Fconsh+1
(8)  





the amounts of energy to sell and to buy in h + 1, by all agents. 
3. Single-unit auctions 
A buyer’s bidding behaviour varies according to the bidding strategy 
put in place for the given auction type. A bidding strategy defines rules 
and constraints that a buyer must follow to determine whether to submit 
the bid and the value of the bid. 
Regarding the single-unit auction models, for all the bidding strate-





aac (9)  
where Lsizeiac is the size of lot i from the auction catalogue ac, E
b
aac is the 
amount of energy that agent a wishes to buy and Ebpaac corresponds to the 
energy that has been previously bought in the auction. This means that 
no buyer will bid energy lots with more energy than it is needed. This 
constraint is used due to the indivisible nature of the single-unit lots, 
D. Teixeira et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 133 (2021) 107235
4
which implies that a buyer must acquire the entire lot. This way, the 
buyer only bids for lots that can be entirely consumed. 
3.1. English auction 
The English auction is an open ascending-price single-unit auction in 
which participants must bid a value higher than that of the latest bid. 
The auctioneer stops the auction when no new bids are received in a 
certain amount of time, and the lot is sold to the highest bidder. A buyer 
can only then submit a bid that is higher than the last submitted bid, 
such that the bidding price ascends as more bids are submitted. The 
corresponding bidding strategy follows the one described in [34]. 
SOaiac = SPa*M
b
h (10)  
IOaiac = L
hb
iac *IPa (11)  
MOaiac = MPa*M
b
h (12)  
where SOaiac corresponds to the starting offer for the lot i, from the auc-
tion catalogue ac, and SPa is a parameterized percentage value to be 
multiplied by the purchase market price, Mbh. The IOaiac is the incremented 
offer, calculated by the product of Lhbiac , the current highest bid for lot i, 
and the increment percentage IPa. The maximum offer MOaiac is the 
product of the maximum price percentage value MPa and Mbh. At the start 
of each auction the Lhbiac is set to be equal to L
min
iac , ascending according to 
the submitted bids. 
The constraint in equation (13) validates if the maximum offer 
parameter is higher than the current auction price. If held true, agent a 
will submit an offer (Oaiac ) for lot i according to equation (14), otherwise, 
no bid will be submitted. 












iac ≥ SOaiac andIOaiac ≤ MOaiac
MOaiac , L
hb
iac ≥ SOaiac andIOaiac > MOaiac
(14) 
Hence, bids are received in ascending order, and after each bid, the 
auction will wait and listen for a higher bid, before closing. If a higher 
bid is received, the closing time is reset, and the auction will attempt to 
wait again. The amount of time that the auction will wait for is given by 
the “closing time”, a set parametrized value. When the closing time 
expires, the auction for the given lot closes, and if bids have been 
received: the winning buyer acquires lot i from the seller at Oaiac , which 
corresponds to Lhbiac . 
3.2. Dutch auction 
This model is based on the Dutch auction, which is an open 
descending-price single-unit auction where the auctioneer sets a high 
enough price so that, presumably, no buyer would want to buy at such 
price, and decrements the price at a given rate. The buyers can choose to 
bid at the current price set by the auctioneer or wait until the price is 
further lowered. The auctioneer then sells the item to the buyer that first 
submits a bid. 
In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer is responsible for calling out a 
current auction price at which each buyer may choose whether to bid. 
The current auction price is first set by the auctioneer to the purchase 
market price (Mbh), which corresponds to the highest value at which a lot 
can be rationally sold. This value is advertised to the buyers and if no bid 
is submitted the current auction price is decremented for the following 
iteration as in equation (15). 
CPiac = CPiac *(1 − DP) (15)  
where CPiac corresponds to the current auction price for lot i of auction 
catalogue ac, and DP refers to a decrement percentage, which is multi-
plied by the current price, thus decrementing it. The current price is 
decremented, advertised, and decremented again until reaching the lot’s 
minimum price (Lminiac ), after which the lot cannot be sold. A lower 
decrement percentage (DP) leads to longer auctions, which take a longer 
time to reach the lot’s minimum price, and a higher decrement per-
centage (DP) results in fewer iterations. A decrement percentage (DP) of 
0.10 was considered and deemed appropriate, as it provides a balance 
between both extremes. 
The winning buyer is the first buyer to submit a bid, accepting the 
current price (CPiac ) advertised by the auctioneer. Each buyer calculates 






where Oaiac is a possible bid from agent a for lot i in auction catalogue ac, 





random draw from the given distribution means that a value is chosen at 
random from the range of Lminiac to MOaiac . 
If the condition (17) is held true, the buyer submits the bid, other-
wise, the buyer will wait for the price to lower further before bidding, 
increasing the possible profit gained from the trade while risking that 
another buyer will bid first and acquire the energy lot. 
Oaiac ≥ CPiac (17)  
3.3. First-Price auction 
The first-price sealed-bid auction, also known as the “blind” auction, 
is a single-unit auction in which each buyer submits a bid in a sealed- 
envelope fashion such that the information regarding their bid re-
mains private throughout the auction process. The auctioneer unseals 
the bids and sells the item to the highest bidder. Contrary to the open 
auctions, in the sealed-bid auctions, the bids for a lot are all submitted in 
one iteration. 
In the first-price sealed-bid auctions, each buyer submits at most one 
bid for each auctioned lot. The bid calculation and submission are pre-
ceded by the constraint (18), which validates that the maximum price 
that the buyer is willing to pay surpasses the minimum price at which 
the lot can be sold. If the constraint is not held true, the buyer will not 
submit a bid for the given lot. 
Lminiac < MOaiac (18) 
Following constraint (18), each buyer calculates a bid by randomly 
drawing a value from a uniform distribution as in equation (16), then 
submitting it to the auctioneer. The auctioneer waits for a certain period 
for all buyers to finish bidding (closing time value), after which the 
sealed bids are opened, and the winning buyer is chosen based on the 
highest bid. The winning buyer proceeds to pay its’ respective bid. 
3.4. Second-price auction 
The second-price auction proposed by William Vickrey in [37], is a 
sealed-bid single-unit auction in which the winning buyer pays the 
second-highest bid, instead of its own. As in the first-price auction, 
buyers submit sealed bids and the auctioneer opens the sealed bids and 
sells the item to the highest bidder. 
If only one bid has been submitted, the price paid in the Vickrey 
auction corresponds to the minimum price for the lot, Lminiac . Hence, in the 
Vickrey auction, the winning buyer always pays a lower value inde-
pendent from his own bid. 
Although rare, two bids can present the same value, thus consisting 
in a tie. As a tiebreaker mechanism, the bid’s age is considered, thus 
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choosing the oldest bid over the latest, for both the Vickrey and Blind 
models. 
4. Multi-unit auctions 
In the two multi-unit auction models, proposed in this paper, lots are 
sold in a sequential manner, similar to the single-unit auctions, contrary 
to popular implementation wherein all the energy lots are auctioned in 
one go, simultaneously. 
Through the simultaneous approach, buyers and sellers announce 
their energy deficit and surplus as bids and lots, respectively. The 
auctioneer proceeds to order bids in descending prices and lots in 
ascending order. After the initial ordering process, the auctioneer 
matches bids and lots, thus deciding the auction’s outcome. Through 
this approach, buyers do not know that lot they are bidding for, for it is 
decided for them by a central entity (the auctioneer). The matching of 
bids and lots by a central entity is contradictory to peer-to-peer trading, 
in which decision making is distributed across autonomous entities. 
On the other hand, the sequential approach consists of auctioning 
one lot a time, sequentially, thus allowing buyers to have knowledge 
about what they are bidding for, and to bid accordingly. The sequential 
approach offers a higher degree of independence and autonomy with 
distributed decision making, which in turn is consistent with peer-to- 
peer trading. 
4.1. Uniform-price auction 
The uniform-price auction (UPA) consists of a sequential multi-unit 
auction in which each lot of the auction’s catalogue is sequentially 
sold at a given market-clearing price. The market-clearing price is a 
value at which a lot’s energy will be traded at. In this auction, this price 
can refer to the value of the highest losing bid or the lowest winning bid 
[36,38]. In this paper, the highest losing bid market-clearing price is 
considered. 
In multi-unit auctions, the buyers submit multiple bids based on 
declining marginal prices (i.e., curving bid). This concept dictates that 
the value of obtaining an additional unit decreases as more units of a 
given commodity are acquired. 
The marginal price can decrease in multiple different ways, varying 
based on individual preferences, commodity, and external environ-
mental factors. In this paper, a simple linear decrease behaviour is 














+ Lminiac (19)  
where P corresponds to the marginal price to be paid given the amount 
of energy already bought (Ebpaac ). 
The price paid for the first unit to be obtained corresponds to the 
maximum value Oaiac , and it decreases linearly, with the last unit price 
being close to the minimum value Lminiac . The maximum value is randomly 
drawn from a uniform distribution, as in equation (16). 
A buyer partitions his desired energy volume into multiple bids and 
calculates their values in accordance with the decreasing marginal price 
concept, following equation (19). The energy allocation through several 
bids is analogous to the way that a seller submits multiple energy lots to 
be sold in a single-unit auction, meaning that the energy is segmented 
into multiple bids based on a maximum bid size threshold. The number 







in which Onumberaiac corresponds to the number of bids of agent a for a lot i of 
the auction catalogue ac, obtained by all the energy to be bought, Ebaac , 
divided by the maximum size threshold, MLsa. As in the single-unit lot 
scenario, in this paper, the maximum size threshold is globally set to 100 
Wh. 
4.2. Discriminatory-price auction 
The Discriminatory-Price auction (DPA) is a “pay-as-bid” sequential 
multi-unit auction. In this auction, buyers submit a single curve bid in a 
sealed-bid format, and the auctioneer orders the bids in descending 
order, allocating energy from the highest to the lowest bid until all en-
ergy is allocated or the bids fall below the lot’s minimum value, as in the 
UPA. 
Contrary to the UPA, in the DPA there is no market-clearing price, 
given that each buyer pays its’ respective bid value. This leads to sce-
narios in which two or more buyers split the same lot but pay potentially 
different prices. 
5. Case studies 
This study considers a microgrid with five prosumers represented by 
five μGIM agents: agent Z.0, agent L.1, agent L.2, agent L.3, and agent 
R.2. Each agent is responsible for the energy management of a physical 
segment of a building. Five SBCs were used, one for each agent: two 
NanoPi M1 Plus (with 1.2 GHz quad-core CPUs and 1 GB of RAM 
running the Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS operating system), and three Raspberry 
Pi Model B+ (with 1.4 GHz 64-bit quad-core CPUs and GB of RAM 
running the Raspberry Pi OS operating system). 
Each agent was responsible to store its own data, using PostgreSQL 
9.5.19 local databases running locally in their SBC. The resulted data is 
analysed in this paper and can be seen in full in [39]. 
The building’s total generation is derived from an array of PV panels 
with 10.0 kW peak generation and was distributed among the five 
agents, with Z.0 receiving 60% of total generation (i.e., 6.0 kW peak 
generation) and the remaining agents receiving 10% each (i.e., 1.0 kW 
each). 
In this paper, a MLsa (i.e., maximum lot size) of 100 Wh was 
considered for every agent. Also, every agent is configured with an mPsa 
of 110%. Regarding the English auction, the “closing time” was defined 
as a subsecond value of 900–650 ms. This value is considered as more 
than sufficient due to the fast communication speed verified in the 
agent-based μGIM platform. 
The results presented in this paper were gathered from the P2P en-
ergy trading framework considering the four single-unit and the two 
multi-unit P2P models, proposed and described in this paper. The 
trading was done between the five microgrid’s agents, using consump-
tion and generation data from May 13th to May 18th, 2019, and 
September 30th to October 6th, 2019, full weeks from Monday to Sun-
day. In total, 2.016 periods were executed where agents could freely 
participate in P2P auctions and a total of 5280 energy lots were trans-
acted among end-users. 
The energy data portrait the real consumption and generation of an 
office building in which the research has been conducted. The building 
is occupied on workdays (Monday to Friday), from 08:00 to 20:00. The 
building’s activity begins at 08:00 when the first building’s occupants 
begin to arrive; most occupants arrive until 11:00. The lunchbreak is 
flexible but generally occurs between 13:00 and 14:00. At the end of the 
day, the first occupants begin to leave the building at 17:00, and at 20:00 
the building is typically left unoccupied. During the night-time 
(20:00–08:00), and on Saturdays and Sundays, the building has no 
occupants. 
The agents are free to participate in the P2P distributed auctions to 
buy and sell energy from their neighbours. However, all of them are 
connected to an energy retailer where they can also buy and sell energy 
at less attractive prices. The market prices considered in this case study 
were 0.10 EUR/kWh, for the selling market price, and 0.20 EUR/kWh, 
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for the purchasing market price. 
The consumption and generation during the considered week of May 
is representative of a high energy generation profile, while the values 
pertaining to the week of September/October correspond to a relatively 
low energy generation profile. Both weeks were chosen to analyse en-
ergy trading where there is a high generation profile, in this case with a 
surplus (more energy generated than consumed) on some days, and a 
low generation profile, providing a heterogeneous range of profiles in 
which to compare the P2P models. 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 refer to energy consumption, generation, and the 
amount of energy available for trading in the microgrid for the two 
considered case studies. 
On the high generation energy profile (Fig. 1), the stationary con-
sumption revolved around 3–4 kWh, occurring during the night and on 
weekends, i.e., in periods in which the building is not being used. During 
the week, at daytime the consumption began to significantly increase in 
the period from 10:00 to 11:00 and still increasing until 13:00. After 
13:00, the increase in consumption either slowed down – on the 13th 
and 14th of May – or slightly decreased – on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of 
May – due to lower usage of the building premises during lunch. 
Work resumes at 14:00, and the consumption increases until around 
16:00–18:00, when it peaked at 8.5–9.3 kWh, on the 13th, 14th, and 
15th of May, and at around 7–7.5 kWh, on the 16th and 17th of May. 
After 18:00 the consumption drops, hitting the stationary consumption 
level around 20:00. Generation throughout the week began at 07:00 and 
lasted until 21:00. During the weekdays, it peaked at 13:00–14:00, with 
values revolving around 6–7 kWh. On the weekend, generation 
increased and hit peaks of 7–7.3 kWh, and surpassed consumption, 
meaning that some of the generated energy could not be traded within 
the microgrid, having to be sold to the grid at the market selling price. 
On the low generation energy profile (Fig. 2), stationary consump-
tion revolved again around 3–4 kWh, during night-time and on the 
weekend. On weekdays, the consumption increased from 10:00 to 
13:00, decreasing or slowing down at around 13:00–14:00 h, and 
increasing until peaking at 16:00–17:00. Afterward, consumption 
decreased until 20:00. The consumption peaked at values revolving 
around 8.3–8.8 kWh, with an exceptionally high peak on September 
30th, at 10 kWh. The generation began at 08:00, lasting until 20:00, and 
peaking around 13:00–14:00. The daily peaks were registered in the 
range of 3.3–4.5 kWh. From Monday to Friday, the amount of energy 
that could be traded was very low, not more than 1.0 kWh, and on some 
days even below 100 Wh. On the weekend, the decrease in consumption 
led to an increase in the energy that could be traded, which went up to 
around 2.0 kWh at the highest peak. 
On the high generation week, the generation period is longer than 
that of the low generation week, with the generation of energy begin-
ning earlier and ending later in the day. The same effect was verified in 
the amount of energy to be traded, in which trade occurred during 
longer periods through the week as compared with the low generation 
week. This resulted in more energy to be traded, despite peaks of energy 
to trade on the low generation week matching the high generation week, 
at around 2.0 kWh. 
6. Discussion 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the daily trading volume for each of the 
framework’s models, regarding the two considered weeks, disregarding 
retailer transactions. Fig. 4 shows energy efficiency (percentage of en-
ergy traded) throughout the case studies the results shown in Fig. 3 show 
that all the models performed well, having close volumes of transacted 
energy. The differences between the models can be seen in Fig. 4, which 
presents the volumes in a percentage format, based on the maximum 
volume of energy that could have been traded. The multi-unit models 
(UPA and DPA) both achieved 100% of energy efficiency throughout the 
case studies. The single-unit models showed a worse performance, and 
no individual model consistently surpassed the other three single-unit 
models, with the four models showing close results throughout the 
case studies. However, the Dutch auction was the worst auction model 
on most occasions. Despite the differences between the six models, the 
lowest daily percentage was that of the Dutch and English models, on 
May 17th, sitting at 96.6%, which proves that all of the models per-
formed very well throughout the case studies, with daily values above 
the 95.0% threshold. 
The percentage of energy trading of the single-unit auctions 
decreased as the volume of energy to be traded increased. This can be 
explained by the choice of which lot to auction being based on a FIFO 
(first-in-first-out) method. Consider two buyers – buyer A and buyer B – 
with demands of 60 Wh (buyer A), and 50 Wh (buyer B), and a single- 
unit auction with an auction catalogue with two lots of 50 Wh and 60 
Wh each. If buyer A, with 60 Wh demand, acquires the 50 Wh lot, then 
the 60 Wh lot will not be sold, due to buyer B needing only 50 Wh. In this 
scenario, buyer B does not acquire its desired energy, and buyer A ac-
quires a suboptimal amount. 
Fig. 5 depicts the relationship between energy efficiency, registered 
every hour throughout the case studies, and the volume of energy to 
trade in the respective hour. Initially, the efficiency remains at 100%, 
decreasing slightly as the trading volume increases, but begins again to 
increase, reaching the 100% mark towards the end. It seems to be that 
with further increases in trading volume, the efficiency will tend to in-
crease towards the 100% mark. 
Although further studies are required to ascertain these beliefs. The 
results show that the lot size impacts the amount of energy being 
transacted in each auction. Therefore, energy lots smaller will have the 
ability to increase energy efficiency while increasing the number of lots 
in the auction catalogue. An alternative would be the set of energy lots 
according to a distribution function or a new strategy of lots creation, 
enabling the agent to provide several lot sizes in the same auction, 
contemplating the existence of small, medium, and large lot sizes. 
Regarding pricing in P2P energy transactions, Fig. 6 shows the daily 
average for each model, as well as the volume of energy to buy, to sell, 
and to be traded in the microgrid during the two weeks. The figure can 
be divided into four scenarios: (I) May 13th to 17th, with moderate- 
Fig. 1. Energy profile for high generation week (May 13th to 19th, 2019).  
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demand and moderate-supply; (II) May 18th to May 19th, with low- 
demand and high-supply; (III) September 30th to October 4th, with 
high-demand and low-supply; (IV) October 5th to 6th, with moderate- 
demand and moderate-supply. 
In the scenario I, prices remain consistently moderate. In the second 
scenario (scenario II) the prices decrease due to the decrease in demand 
and the increase in supply. The prices in scenario III increase compared 
to the scenario I and II, with the increase in demand and the decrease in 
supply. Scenario IV is similar to the scenario I, with moderate-demand, 
moderate-supply, and hence, moderate price ranges. The price fluctua-
tions according to changes in demand and supply are consistent with the 
economic law of supply and demand, which states that: if demand in-
creases and supply remains the same, the price increases, and if supply 
increases while demand remains the same, the price decreases [40]. 
The way an auction model’s prices react to changes in the environ-
ment (i.e., supply and demand) varies based on the degree of price 
stickiness, which refers to how much price increases or decreases as a 
result of supply and demand changes. For example, in a scenario in 
which demand increases by 2 kWh a model may increase its price by 
0.04 EUR/kWh, while another model may increase only by 0.01 EUR/ 
kWh. In the given example, the latter model has a “stickier” price than 
the first. 
The standard deviation of the models’ daily average prices experi-
enced throughout the two case studies provides the means to compare 
the degree of price stickiness, given that a high standard deviation (SD) 
corresponds to a low price stickiness degree, and vice-versa. Following 
this notion, the six models can be divided into three groups, as follows: 
(I) Vickrey (SD = 0.014), UPA (SD = 0.014) and DPA (SD = 0.012); (II) 
Dutch (SD = 0.005) and Blind (SD = 0.006); (III) English (SD = 0.019). 
The first group has a standard deviation of 0.012–0.014, representing a 
moderate degree of price stickiness. The second group presents a standard 
deviation of 0.005–0.006, half of that of the first group, which in turn 
indicates to a higher degree of price stickiness and less price reactivity to 
market changes. The third group experiences the lowest degree of price 
stickiness with a standard deviation of 0.019, which can be further 
analysed by the way in which the daily average price of the English 
model varies across the case studies and the different market scenarios. 
Fig. 2. Energy profile for low generation week (September 30th to October 6th, 2019).  
Fig. 3. Amount of daily energy traded for each model, during both high and 
low generation weeks. 
Fig. 4. Percentage of daily energy trading efficiency for each model during 
both high and low generation weeks. 
Fig. 5. Energy efficiency percentage by hourly volume of energy traded, 
gathered from both weeks. 
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Fig. 7 further illustrates how each model’s price reacts to supply and 
demand fluctuations. This figure consists of the model’s average hourly 
prices ordered based on a competitiveness index and grouped into 11 
categories, consisting of ranges of 1.0 kWh. The competitiveness index 
consists of the difference between the amount of energy to buy and the 
amount of energy to sell in the respective hour. The Vickrey, UPA, and 
DPA models increase in a linear fashion, as do the Blind and Dutch 
models, although these two introduce a curve with a much lower 
inclination than the one followed by the first three models. The English 
model is the one with the highest price adaptability, increasing at a fast 
pace, stagnating upon reaching the 2.0–3.0 kWh range. 
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the average price and traded energy volume 
for each model, considering the two case studies, on a per prosumer/ 
agent basis. Regarding the amount of energy traded, there are agents 
who sold energy, who bought energy, and those who performed both 
throughout the case studies. Agent Z.0 bought an insignificant amount 
of energy, and sold around 70 kWh, being the largest seller among the 
five agents. Besides agent Z.0, the only agents who sold energy were 
agents L.3 and R.2. These two agents bought and sold energy, although 
each sold around 5 kWh, and bought an approximate amount. On the 
other hand, agents L.1 and L.2 acted as unique buyers, not selling any of 
their generated energy. Agent L.2 was the largest buyer, averaging 51.4 
kWh, followed by agent L.1, who bought an average of 21.4 kWh. 
The average pricing experienced by these agents differs. Agent L.2, 
the largest buyer, experienced the lowest buying prices on all models. 
Agent L.1 had lower buying prices than agents L.3 and R.2, despite the 
differences being negligible on some of the models, such as on the En-
glish and Dutch. These results show an inverse relationship between the 
amount of energy an agent buys and the prices he pays. This relationship 
is expected and comes in accordance with the economic law of demand, 
wherein the quantity of demand and price are inversely correlated, 
meaning that the increase of one of the two values results in the decrease 
of the other [41]. 
Regarding the average selling price, agent Z.0 shows a higher selling 
price than that of agents L.3 and R.2 on the Dutch, Blind, and Vickrey 
models, and an equivalent or lower price on the English, UPA, and DPA 
models. According to the law of supply, it is expected that agent Z.0 
would experience higher values than those of agents L.3 and R.2. 
However, on some models, this does not occur. The inconsistency in 
these results comes from the use of a simplistic strategy for lot minimum 
price calculation, which is always set to 0.110 EUR/kWh. 
The use of a static price makes the sellers behave as price-takers, not 
influencing pricing schemes in the auction models. Therefore, sellers 
accept the prices set by the buyers who, in turn, influence the market 
prices through more dynamic bidding strategies, hence acting as price- 
makers. Furthermore, agent Z.0 vastly surpasses agents L.3 and R.2 in 
terms of volume sold, which could result in agent Z.0 acting in a 
monopolistic manner with better strategies. 
Despite differences between the various models and pricing schemes, 
all models resulted in profits for every microgrid end-user, as seen in 
Table 1. The UPA and DPA models showed the highest percentage of 
monetary savings for the two considered case studies, both with 6.11% 
and 1.31% for the high and low generation weeks, respectively. The 
Vickrey, Blind, and English models followed, with 6.02–6.03% and 
1.30% for the two case studies. The Dutch model emerged as the worst 
model, with 6.00% and 1.29%, consistent with the notion that the Dutch 
was the worst model from an energy trading efficiency perspective. 
Agent Z.0, the largest seller, experienced the highest benefit with the 
Blind model (99.39%, and 5.46% for high generation and low genera-
tion weeks, respectively), and the lowest with the Vickrey (52.32%, and 
2.49%) and the UPA (46.39%, and 3.13%) models. Agents L.1 and L.2, 
the largest buyers, had the highest profits with the Vickrey (4.50%, and 
0.78% for L.1)(4.91%, and 1.42% for L.2) and the UPA (4.16%, and 
0.87%)(5.52%, and 1.23%) models. The Vickrey and the UPA models 
Fig. 6. Daily average prices and consumption/generation energy volume.  
Fig. 7. Average pricing vs the difference between demand and supply 
(competitiveness). 
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are the ones with the lowest average price. Therefore, they primarily 
benefit buyers, while the Blind model, due to its higher price, benefits 
the sellers. 
Given the Vickrey and the Blind models as two extremes, it could be 
assumed that the English model would provide a ground between the 
two models in which both the buyers and sellers are equally benefited. 
However, for agent L.1 the English auction is associated with the worst 
result. An alternative would a sealed-bid single-unit auction model in 
which first-price and the second-price rules, employed by the Blind and 
the Vickrey models, are used with 50% probability. This way, both the 
Fig. 8. Individual volume of energy sold and bought in each model.  
Fig. 9. Individual average prices for each model.  
Table 1 
Weekly monetary energy expenses, and profit percentage, per agent.     
Z.0 L.1 L.2 L.3 R.2 Microgrid 
High Generation Week (May 13th to 19th) Weekly Expenses 
(EUR) 
Without P2P 3.069 € 27.575 € 59.921 € 9.538 € 4.611 € 104.714 € 
English 0.123 € 27.174 € 57.611 € 9.281 € 4.225 € 98.414 € 
Dutch 0.327 € 26.749 € 57.903 € 9.232 € 4.219 € 98.430 € 
Blind 0.019 € 26.795 € 58.065 € 9.272 € 4.248 € 98.398 € 
Vickrey 1.463 € 26.335 € 56.978 € 9.295 € 4.343 € 98.414 € 
Discriminatory 0.429 € 26.644 € 57.500 € 9.345 € 4.400 € 98.319 € 
Uniform 1.645 € 26.427 € 56.611 € 9.233 € 4.402 € 98.319 € 
Savings (%) English 96.01% 1.45% 3.85% 2.70% 8.36% 6.02% 
Dutch 89.35% 3.00% 3.37% 3.21% 8.49% 6.00% 
Blind 99.39% 2.83% 3.10% 2.79% 7.87% 6.03% 
Vickrey 52.32% 4.50% 4.91% 2.55% 5.80% 6.02% 
Discriminatory 86.03% 3.37% 4.04% 2.02% 4.56% 6.11% 
Uniform 46.39% 4.16% 5.52% 3.19% 4.52% 6.11% 




Without P2P 15.785 € 28.294 € 72.202 € 11.949 € 7.451 € 135.681 € 
English 15.153 € 28.218 € 71.304 € 11.904 € 7.341 € 133.921 € 
Dutch 15.014 € 28.125 € 71.530 € 11.892 € 7.377 € 133.936 € 
Blind 14.923 € 28.178 € 71.565 € 11.899 € 7.355 € 133.921 € 
Vickrey 15.392 € 28.073 € 71.177 € 11.893 € 7.382 € 133.916 € 
Discriminatory 15.154 € 28.157 € 71.350 € 11.892 € 7.355 € 133.908 € 
Uniform 15.292 € 28.049 € 71.315 € 11.882 € 7.370 € 133.908 € 
Savings (%) English 4.00% 0.27% 1.24% 0.37% 1.47% 1.30% 
Dutch 4.89% 0.60% 0.93% 0.48% 0.99% 1.29% 
Blind 5.46% 0.41% 0.88% 0.41% 1.29% 1.30% 
Vickrey 2.49% 0.78% 1.42% 0.47% 0.92% 1.30% 
Discriminatory 4.00% 0.49% 1.18% 0.47% 1.28% 1.31% 
Uniform 3.13% 0.87% 1.23% 0.55% 1.08% 1.31%  
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sellers and the buyers could be equally benefited. This alternative re-
quires further analysis to ensure the hypothesis of equal benefit for 
sellers and buyers holds true. 
Similarly, a case can be made towards the conception of a model 
balancing the UPA and the DPA, given that the UPA benefits the buyers 
whilst the DPA benefits the sellers, though to a lesser degree in this study 
than the Blind model. 
Theoretically, the Dutch and the Blind models are strategically 
equivalent, as well as the English and Vickrey models [36,37], and as 
such should yield close theoretical revenue. However, results show that 
in both equivalencies there is a significant difference in average pricing. 
This discrepancy between theory and the actual results is due to the 
different bidding strategies being used across the four models, in which 
the Blind and Vickrey employ similar strategies but different from the 
ones used by the English and Dutch, due to their open auction nature. 
The determination of a single price for each lot, to be used in every bid 
request corresponding to that lot is expected to close the gap between 
the equivalent single-unit models. Furthermore, the English model does 
not use randomly drawn values in its bidding strategy, which may also 
contribute to distinct revenues. 
The participation in P2P auctions allows end-users to buy and sell 
their energy demand and surplus. However, this is based on forecasting 
algorithms that enable the hour-ahead P2P transactions. The errors 
associated with the forecasting algorithms will affect the efficient hour- 
ahead planning of the end-user and during the period it can be forced to 
sell or buy more energy than the amount transacted in the P2P auctions. 
In this case, the end-user can have two approaches to balance energy 
demand and supply, (i) sell or buy the remaining energy at less attractive 
prices to/from the retailer, and (ii) use the flexibility of local energy 
resources to balance the consumption and the generation (i.e., local 
generation available plus the energy bought in P2P auctions). The µGIM 
solution enables agents to have those two approaches. The negotiation 
with its neighbours (using P2P) and with the retailer can be seen in [35]. 
And the real-time balance between consumption and generation, 
considering user preferences, can be seen in [2]. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper explores the concept of transactive energy through peer- 
to-peer energy trading within a microgrid, using the μGIM agent-based 
management system. A single-unit and multi-unit auction framework 
was proposed, considering six P2P models based on the English, Dutch, 
Vickrey, and Blind single-unit auctions, and on the discriminatory-price 
and uniform-price multi-unit auctions. The peer-to-peer models were 
tested in a real microgrid with five prosumers. The results are shown for 
a high generation week (May 13th – 19th, 2019), and a low generation 
week (September 30th – October 6th, 2019). Each model was imple-
mented using simple bidding strategies, most of which based on random 
draws from uniform distributions, as well as the concept of a lot with a 
size threshold allowing the use of single-unit auctions for trading multi- 
unit commodities, such as energy, and the notion of diminishing mar-
ginal price, applied to the multi-unit auctions’ bidding strategy. 
The six hour-ahead proposed models were implemented in the multi- 
agent system of the microgrid and executed simultaneously every hour. 
The execution of such models in single-board computers proved the 
possibility of having low computational hardware deployed in the end- 
users (fog-computing) to enable peer-to-peer transactions without the 
need of a centralized operator. 
The proposed auction framework for energy trading, through the six 
peer-to-peer models, has shown compliance with the economic law of 
supply and demand. Thus, supporting the usage of transactive energy 
peer-to-peer trading, and the framework in specific, for energy demand 
and supply balancing, ensuring greater grid reliability and stability. The 
adoption of more sophisticated strategies for both sellers and buyers 
would enable a deeper analysis considering both the seller’s and the 
buyer’s perspectives. Different strategies might improve the proposed 
framework and provide the means to compare peer-to-peer auction 
models based on behaviours closer to those that may be experienced in 
real-world auction scenarios. Moreover, better strategies for the sellers 
may enable the analysis of compliance with the economic law of supply 
and the use of case studies in which the volume of energy to sell is better 
disperse, avoiding the occurrence of monopolistic behaviours. 
The use of flexibility was introduced in this paper as part of a 
balancing algorithm to be used after peer-to-peer transactions, reducing 
grid transactions in real-time. However, bid strategies accounting end- 
user flexibility can be applied to increase the end-user profit in the 
peer-to-peer auction-based transactions. 
The Blind auction model proved to be the best from the sellers’ 
perspective, while the Vickrey and the uniform-price were the models 
with better results for the buyers. The found results support the creation 
of a new mixed model based on first- and second-price auction types, to 
equally benefit buyers and sellers. Likewise, the new model should also 
take into account the balancing of uniform- and discriminatory-price 
models. 
Despite the differences in seller-buyer benefit ratio, the multi-unit 
auctions outperformed the single-unit auctions, with a 100% energy 
trading efficiency and greater monetary savings, registering values of 
6.11% on the week with a high generation profile, and 1.31% on the 
week with a low generation profile, in comparison to the values of 
6.00–6.03% and 1.29–1.30% of the single-unit auctions. Therefore, it 
can be stated that the multi-unit auctions are superior to the single-unit 
auctions regarding the case studies highlighted in this paper. Although 
further research is required into the comparison of multi-unit and single- 
unit auctions, this paper supports the future implementation of multi- 
unit over single-unit auctions for peer-to-peer energy trading among 
microgrid end-users. 
The proposed framework has proven to be able to test multiple peer- 
to-peer auction models simultaneously in a real uncontrollable envi-
ronment, such as the used microgrid. Overall, the four single-unit and 
the two multi-unit models implemented in the proposed framework 
enabled approximately 6.00% decrease in energy expenditure on the 
high generation week and a 1.30% decrease on the low generation 
weeks. Every end-user in the microgrid benefited from peer-to-peer 
energy trading through every model, in comparison to peer-to-grid 
trading. This proves the potential of a transactive energy approach 
using peer-to-peer auctions for the end-users’ economic benefit. 
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